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given to other angles of consideration. Although the author is generally moderate in his conclusions and treatment, his sympathies are apparent; he has drawn his material too exclusively from French sources. An extensive acquaintance with French official documents is demonstrated but there are no signs that many excellent secondary books have been exploited—particularly German books. The recent books of Eckardstein, Schwertfeger, Hammann and Friedjung have much of general importance to contribute to a study of this kind. It is strange that no reference is made, in presenting the Moroccan question, to the work of Closs, Zimmermann, Diercks, or Wirth, not to mention the books of the Frenchmen, Bernard and Gourdin.

A bibliography of eight pages, although not announced as comprehensive, ought, in a book of this character, to contain some critique, and it should not omit so many obvious titles; at least all books cited in the text should be included. Cases in point are Jaray, *La Politique Franco-Anglaise*, cited p. 109, note 23, and Millet, *Notre Politique Extérieure*, cited p. 121, note 49. There are many similar omissions in the index.

LAURENCE BRADFORD PACKARD.

My Memoirs. By Prince LUDWIG WINDISCHGRAETZ. Translated by Constance Vesey. (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1921. Pp. 356. \$5.00.)

FROM three of the most important statesmen in Austria-Hungary during the war we now have valuable personal narratives written in the time of their downfall or exile—Czernin, Andrassy, and Windischgraetz. From a fourth, greater than any of this trio, we shall probably have nothing, for Stephan Tisza was assassinated on the flagstones of his own baronial hall at the very close of the war, just as the rotten fabric of the Hapsburg monarchy was falling to pieces. Czernin's *In the World War* is valuable for its inside information on the Brest-Litovsk and other diplomatic negotiations which he conducted as foreign minister until his fall in 1917; but as an apologia it is hardly convincing. Julius Andrassy's *Diplomatie und Weltkrieg* analyzes with clear penetration, almost with philosophic calm, the complex internal conditions in the Dual Monarchy into which he had been initiated by his more famous father; with his clear grasp of the situation it was probably unfortunate that he lacked that political ambition and passion for action, of which most of his fellow-Magyar aristocrats had an excess, and so did not finally become foreign minister until October 25, 1918—when it was too late to salvage any of the wreckage. Of these three volumes of memoirs, the most valuable to the historian is unquestionably that of Prince Windischgraetz, because of its greater length, its vividness, and the diary-like detailed accounts of the telephone messages, secret meetings, and journeys of its tireless author.

Prince Ludwig Windischgraetz, grandson of the field-marshal who suppressed revolution in Vienna in 1848 and son of one of the highest officers in the old army, by birth and social position belonged to the circle of distinguished, powerful, and narrow-minded Magyar aristocrats. But in his strenuous youth he had learned that there was a world beyond Tokay and that he was no longer living in the age of feudalism. As military attaché with the tsar's troops in the Russo-Japanese War he was captured at Fakumen, but set at liberty by the Japanese. In New York he was ambushed by thieves, fired upon a mulatto, and had to spend the night in jail. After lion-hunting in Africa and other travels he returned to restore the prosperity of his ancestral vineyards in Hungary, married Maria Széchenyi, and "plunged into the petty arena of Hungarian county politics with my head full of world political theories and studies which embraced every quarter of the globe" (p. 23). But this life did not satisfy his fiery energy. In the annexation crisis of 1908, disguising himself as a machinist and waiter, he collected secret information in Serbia. During the following months of calm before the storm he constantly attacked Berchtold (a cousin of his wife's) for his vacillation and incompetence. In 1914 this stormy petrel was only thirty-two years old, but he had learned to look beyond a policy of petty intrigue, and to recognize, as Sir Robert Hart had once told him in China, that "European policy must keep in view an area extending from Vladivostok to the Rhine".

The greater part of Windischgraetz's memoirs is the story of the fight he made, during the war, against the "system", the autocratic clique of corrupt and incompetent military and diplomatic officials who had plunged the Dual Monarchy into a war which they did not know how to conduct effectively. But for three years, while he was serving most of the time at the front, he could do little but protest against the unwise orders which came from the military clique. The Austrian Supreme Command was often working at cross purposes with the Austrian Foreign Office; to one of his protests he received the classic reply, "The Foreign Office must not know what policy the Supreme Command is pursuing" (p. 96)! In contrast to his contempt for the Austrian Supreme Command is his admiration for the efficiency of Emperor William's officers on the southeastern front; yet he was equally opposed to Burian's foreign policy, "which was characterized from the very first by indiscriminating and slavish recognition of German control" (p. 101).

After the death of Francis Joseph some of the Supreme Command, who were more concerned with military decorations than service at the front, were dismissed. At the Ballhausplatz Burian gave way to Czernin, and Tisza yielded the Hungarian premiership to Wekerle. Finally, in October, 1917, Windischgraetz himself was appointed Hun-

garian food minister, an office which he apparently filled with great energy and success. He now won the esteem of Emperor Charles, became one of his most intimate advisers, and secured his theoretical approval for a wide-reaching programme of reform which Windischgraetz laid before him in May, 1918; an unequivocal statement to Germany of Austria's absolute inability to carry on the war longer; an immediate separate peace with the Entente if Germany insisted on continuing the war; autonomy for the subject nationalities (except Galicia which was to be ceded to Poland); and universal suffrage in Hungary. But Charles had not the courage to put this programme into practical effect—until it was too late. Windischgraetz and Szilassy both think the Monarchy and much of its territory could have been saved if the emperor had acted on this programme at once. This however is very doubtful; at least it must remain one of the unsolved "ifs" of history. When at last Charles did act on Windischgraetz's advice by appointing Julius Andrassy as foreign minister (Oct. 25), the débâcle had already begun. National councils had been set up in Prag, Agram, and Budapest; Germany was in retreat in France; and the Italians were breaking through in the South. In Hungary Andrassy's own son-in-law, Károlyi, driven by ambition, treacherously deceived his father and dethroned his emperor. Windischgraetz, who remained loyal to Charles and was one of those who shared in his second ill-starred effort to return to the Hungarian throne in October, 1921, is very bitter against Károlyi; perhaps he paints his perfidy too black. Here, and in some other passages, his statements must probably be taken *cum grano salis*.

Nowhere is there a better account than in this spirited book of why and how the Dual Monarchy at last collapsed.

SIDNEY B. FAY.

Life of Venizelos. By S. B. CHESTER (Chester of Wethersfield and Blary), with a Letter from His Excellency M. Venizelos. (New York: George H. Doran Company. 1921. Pp. xvi, 321. \$6.00.)

MR. CHESTER has had exceptional advantages in the performance of his task. In addition to five friends of the statesman, among them his permanent secretary, to whom he expresses his obligations (add Mr. Leonard Magnus, p. 305, note), M. Venizelos himself "found time . . . to enlighten me [the author] upon various matters connected with his life and work" (p. vii), and, indeed, in the introductory letter states that he read that part of the book which deals with the Cretan Question (p. vi). We may, therefore, regard the present biography as being in a sense "inspired", a circumstance which should guarantee it an unusual value among books of the kind, and in particular may assume that the record of the Cretan imbroglio, which is here presented at considerable length, gives an unusually accurate account of this confused period from the point of view of the chief actor therein; and these chapters